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Assessing the Strength of Pentecostal 
Churches’ Electoral Support:  
Evidence from Brazil 
Fábio Lacerda 
Abstract: Since the 1980s, the number of Pentecostal candidates elected 
to the Brazilian legislatures has grown remarkably. Literature has argued 
that the phenomenon is related to Pentecostal churches’ support for 
particular candidates. To date, however, this claim has been based only 
on ethnographies or studies relying on a few cases of elected candidates. 
Drawing from a new data set of Evangelical (Protestant) candidates for 
the Federal Chamber of Deputies and state legislative assemblies, I try to 
answer the following questions: Do Pentecostal candidates raise fewer 
campaign resources than other candidates? What is the effect of being a 
Pentecostal candidate on the vote in Brazilian legislative elections? Is the 
structure of the church relevant to this effect? Using OLS regression 
models, I show that being a Pentecostal has a negative, though not sig-
nificant effect on campaign spending. Additionally, there is a positive 
statistical relationship between being a Pentecostal and receiving votes, 
and between having the support of more centralized churches and re-
ceiving votes. Qualitative evidence of six Pentecostal politicians who lost 
their churches’ support at some point between elections, attempted 
reelection, and performed considerably worse than before reinforces the 
importance of having the support of a Pentecostal church. 
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Introduction 
In recent decades, Evangelical electoral mobilization in Brazil has grown 
remarkably. Evangelical candidates obtained third place in the 2002, 
2010, and 2014 presidential elections. In 2015 a Pentecostal representa-
tive was elected speaker of the Chamber of Deputies. In the 2016 munic-
ipal elections, a bishop from the Universal Church of the Kingdom of 
God was elected mayor of the city of Rio de Janeiro. The Evangelical 
presence has strengthened since the 1980s, when Pentecostal churches 
adopted the strategy of supporting official candidates. Since then, the 
number of elected Evangelicals has grown considerably, especially those 
supported by Pentecostal churches.1 
The political impact of Evangelical growth in Latin America has re-
ceived scholarly attention since the late 1960s. Part of the social science 
literature investigating the phenomenon has stressed how Pentecostal 
churches use clientelistic practices harmful to democracy, having strong 
electoral support from their faithful, depicted as the “herd vote” for 
these politicians (D’Epinay 1970; Bastian 1994; Chesnut 1997; Gaskill 
1997). The first Pentecostal churches arrived in Brazil at the beginning of 
the twentieth century, and, just as the mainline Protestant churches, had 
a discreet political presence. However, from the 1980s on, Pentecostal 
churches began to mobilize electorally and politically, thereby garnering 
more academic attention (Mariano and Pierucci 1992; Freston 1993; 
Pierucci and Prandi 1995; Fernandes 1998; Oro 2003; Borges 2009; 
Mariano and Oro 2011; Reich and Santos 2013; Machado and Burity 
2014; Smith 2016; Cerqueira 2017). This mobilization, combined with 
the growth of the Evangelical population, the electoral system of open-
list proportional representation, and the high magnitude of Brazilian 
electoral districts, contributed to the Evangelical electoral success. In 
1998 just 29 Evangelical candidates were elected to the Chamber of 
Deputies, but by 2014 this number had reached 67, representing almost 
15 percent of the federal legislature (Lacerda 2017). Although under-
represented in the Brazilian parliament, the political representation of 
                                                 
1  I would like to thank Paolo Ricci, George Avelino, Claudia Cerqueira, Natália 
Bueno, Sergio Simoni Jr., Guadalupe Tuñon, Paulo Baia, and the JPLA anon-
ymous reviewers for their helpful comments. Any remaining errors are mine 
alone. Some of the material presented here was delivered at seminars at the 
University of São Paulo and at the 41st Annual Meeting of ANPOCS in Cax-
ambu, Brazil. The data set and replication materials are available from the au-
thor upon request. 
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Evangelicals is greater than that of other minority groups, such as wom-
en and Afro-Brazilians. 
Brazil is home to the world’s fourth-largest Evangelical population 
(Pew Research Center 2011).2 The last Brazilian Census (2010) found 
just over 42 million Evangelicals (22.2 percent of the total population), 
and this number has grown since then. According to a sample survey 
conducted in October 2017, 32 percent of Brazilians declare themselves 
Evangelicals (Instituto Datafolha 2017). However, and despite a growing 
literature on Evangelical political mobilization in Brazil, few studies have 
provided evidence of the impact of churches’ support on Evangelical 
candidates. Among the exceptions are Fernandes (1998), Bohn (2004), 
and Boas (2014). The reason for this lacuna is, at least in part, the diffi-
culty in obtaining data on Evangelical candidates and churches. Moreo-
ver, the few existing studies are based on surveys. There is no quantita-
tive study of Brazilian Evangelical candidates that uses electoral data and 
includes non-elected candidates. The lack of more accurate research on 
the support of churches for Evangelical candidates, as well as on Evan-
gelical electoral performance in general, renders any statement about the 
electoral strength of Evangelicals an untested assumption. Drawing from 
a new data set of Evangelical candidacies for the Chamber of Deputies 
and state legislative assemblies, I try to fill this gap by offering new evi-
dence for the debate on political representation of Evangelicals in Brazil. 
In particular, I try to answer the following questions: Do Pentecostal 
candidates raise more or fewer campaign resources than other candi-
dates? What is the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate in Brazilian 
legislative elections? Is the structure of the church relevant to this effect? 
The findings of this paper shed new light on the understanding of 
Evangelical political representation. I present evidence that it is actually 
uncompetitive Evangelical candidates who use religious titles (e.g. “pas-
tor,” “bishop”) in their official electoral names. I show that candidates 
supported by Pentecostal churches have a lower “voting cost” – that is, 
spend less money per vote received – than other candidates. Using OLS 
regression models, I find there is a negative, though not statistically sig-
nificant association between being a Pentecostal candidate and campaign 
spending. From these tests, I also find that there is an effect of being 
supported by a Pentecostal church on the number of votes received, and 
that this effect is stronger than that of merely being an Evangelical can-
didate without church support. Finally, the effect of being supported by 
                                                 
2  In this article, I use the term “Evangelical” as a synonym for “Protestant,” as 
most Latin American evangélicos do. 
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churches with larger and more centralized structures is greater than that 
of being supported by other churches. The tests do not completely iso-
late the mechanism explaining the effect of being Pentecostal on the 
vote. It is not possible, for example, to affirm that such an effect is due 
only to the church support, and not also to Evangelical identity, which 
could have an heuristic effect on Evangelical voters, inclining them to 
vote for candidates belonging to their own social group. I present data 
from six cases of Pentecostal politicians who lost their churches’ support 
throughout the term, but still ran for reelection. The fact that none of 
them succeeded in being reelected, and all of them got far fewer votes 
than they had when supported by the church, serves as a counterfactual 
to reinforce the conjecture on the importance of the support of a Pente-
costal church. 
Although this work focuses on Pentecostal churches in Brazil, its 
findings contribute to a broader debate on religion and comparative 
politics. Despite the predictions of secularization theories that religions 
would become more and more privatized and suffer a slow and gradual 
decline, the empirical evidence that supports these two hypotheses has 
been challenged. Since the 1970s, religious movements have demonstrat-
ed growing vitality and increased political activism. The Iranian Revolu-
tion, the performance of liberation theology in Latin America, and the 
rise of the New Christian Right in the United States are some of the 
best-known examples (Casanova 1994). With regard to religious practice 
and belief, strong evidence suggests that there is no decline in these indi-
cators, but, on the contrary, perhaps even growth (Stark 1999). This 
paper, while not directly addressing the debate on secularization, con-
tributes to the discussion of the vitality and political role of religions in 
liberal democracies. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. I first provide an 
overview of the debate on Pentecostals and legislative elections in Brazil. 
I next develop the theory and hypotheses, demonstrating the data and 
variables used. After presenting the results and findings, I offer qualita-
tive evidence of candidates supported by churches who lost their support 
throughout the term, decided to run for reelection, and were not reelect-
ed. This evidence serves as a counterfactual argument that, were church 
support absent, Evangelical candidates would not have been elected. 
Finally, in the last section I discuss the findings and present final com-
ments. 
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Pentecostals and Elections 
The growth of the Evangelical population in Latin America during the 
twentieth century has aroused the interest of social scientists as to the 
causes and possible consequences of the phenomenon. From the outset, 
one interest of researchers was the relationship between Pentecostal 
growth and Latin American politics. Pentecostalism is a branch of Evan-
gelicalism that emphasizes the gifts of the Holy Spirit. Pentecostal 
churches tend to be more sectarian than mainline Protestant churches, 
although since the 1970s they have become more open to liberal secular 
culture. In addition, their members have a different profile, having on 
average lower income and education levels than mainline Protestants. 
From the beginning, the studies presented different visions and progno-
ses. While some have suggested that the growth of Evangelicalism could 
have positive effects on the region’s democracies (Willems 1967; Stoll 
1990; Martin 1990; Mariz 1992; Smith 1994; Dodson 1997), others have 
highlighted the possible negative effects (Epinay 1970; Bastian 1994; 
Chesnut 1997; Gaskill 1997). In this view, Pentecostal churches would 
enter politics by promoting clientelistic and harmful practices to democ-
racy. Pentecostal leaders would act as brokers, supposedly controlling the 
votes of their congregations and using them in order to maintain unjust 
social structures. In the case of Brazil, bishops and pastors would be 
recruited by political parties – usually from the center or right – to run 
for legislative elections. Once elected, they would benefit their churches 
with pork. The argument is based on the assumption that a church’s 
congregation would offer a considerable degree of electoral support to 
its leaders. 
According to the 2010 Brazilian Census, more than 22 percent of 
Brazilians declared themselves Evangelicals, divided among Pentecostals 
(13.3 percent), mainline Protestants (4.0 percent), and unaffiliated 
Protestants (4.8 percent). The growth of the Evangelical population was 
accompanied by the rise of Evangelical political representation. Since the 
1990s, studies on the Brazilian case have noted that the entry of Evangel-
ical leaders into electoral contests was a phenomenon circumscribed to a 
small set of Pentecostal churches. The process began with the Assembly 
of God (AG) and the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 
(UCKG) and was later emulated by other churches. Despite organiza-
tional differences, these churches have started to support “official candi-
dates” for legislatures (Freston 1993). 
In Brazil, federal and state elections are held concomitantly and eve-
ry four years. They elect a president, 513 federal deputies, and 81 sena-
tors at the federal level, and a governor and a varying number of state 
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deputies at the state level. Legislators can run indefinitely for reelection, 
but the Brazilian open-list proportional representation (OLPR) electoral 
system makes reelection far more uncertain for incumbents than, for 
example, for US politicians. Despite the fact that the presidential election 
is the contest that structures and influences all the rest (Limongi and 
Cortez 2010), Brazilian multiparty presidentialism makes it important for 
chief executives to have a strong base within the legislatures. 
The growing number of Pentecostal representatives from the 1980s 
onwards led social scientists to ask about the “strength” of Pentecostal 
candidates, as well as the degree of support of the congregations for their 
leaders.3 From a sample survey applied in the metropolitan region of Rio 
de Janeiro that focused exclusively on Evangelicals, Fernandes (1998) 
revealed that87 percent of AG churchgoers reported that they voted in 
the 1994 elections for candidates supported by their church. In the case 
of UCKG churchgoers, the corresponding data point was 95 percent. 
Respondents from the Baptist Church and other mainline churches said 
they voted for more Pentecostal candidates than candidates of their own 
denominations. This evidence was, however, not supported by a 2013 
Datafolha Institute sample survey, according to which only 18 percent of 
Pentecostal voters said they had at some point voted for a candidate 
supported by their church.4 
The growth of Evangelical political representation in Brazil has 
mainly been due to the success of Pentecostal candidates supported by 
their churches. To date, the most illustrative cases cited by researchers 
have been those of the AG, UCKG, and the Church of the Foursquare 
Gospel (CFG). However, other Pentecostal churches have also received 
media attention for their support of their own official candidates (see, 
for example, O Globo 2014, and Gospel Prime 2015). It is worth noting that 
in Brazil, it is illegal to carry out political advertising in churches and 
other places of worship (Lei 9,504/97, Art. 37). In fact, the prohibition is 
not restricted to places of worship; rather, there is a general ban against 
political propaganda in public places, including cinemas, clubs, stores, 
and shopping centers. The statute is vague, providing considerable lee-
                                                 
3  For the sake of simplicity, I use the term “Pentecostal candidate” as an equiva-
lent of “candidate supported by a Pentecostal church.” In Brazil, most of the 
larger Pentecostal churches mobilize electorally and promote candidates to 
their congregations. 
4  Datafolha 2013. These results should be viewed with caution. Due to a desirabil-
ity bias, many respondents are likely to say they have never followed the orien-
tation of their church or pastor, even though they have already done so. 
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way for discussion of what activities and speeches constitute political 
propaganda and where they can or cannot be made. 
In general, the electoral performance of Pentecostal candidates 
seems to be related to the type of church that supports them. Some 
variables are of particular relevance, such as church size (number of 
individual churches, number of members), media structure, hierarchical 
centralization, and emphasis on candidate support. In other words, the 
larger the church is in terms of structure and number of believers, the 
greater and more emphatic the institution’s support for its candidates is, 
and the more centralized its structure, the greater the likelihood of elec-
toral success. Church centralization is also related to the process of can-
didate selection. In a church where there is strong decision-making cen-
tralization, candidates are selected by the hierarchy and the non-selected 
are left aside. Accordingly, the absence of centralization makes the selec-
tion process less controlled, allowing those who have not been officially 
selected to compete for the congregation’s votes. 
The UCKG appears to be the prototypical case of corporate Pente-
costal representation. Founded in 1977 by Edir Macedo, it is not only 
one of the largest Pentecostal churches in Brazil, but also known to be 
more emphatic in supporting its candidates than other churches, and 
certainly has one of the most centralized ecclesial structures among 
Evangelical churches (Oro 2003a; Mariano 2004; Barbosa 2015). The 
AG, on the other hand, being the largest Evangelical church in Brazil, is 
divided among several ministries, and, at least until 2014, did not have 
rigorous candidate-selection control. The church permits some members 
to run as candidates despite having been defeated in church primaries. 
Hence, the congregation’s votes may end up dispersed among several 
candidates (Borges Jr. 2010). Finally, the CFG boasts membership num-
bers close to those of the UCKG, but, despite its organizational structure 
and support for official candidates (Schoenfelder and Paz 2006), its ad-
missions process does not seem as controlled as the UCKG’s, and does 
not seem to apply the same amount of “pressure” to its members as the 
UCKG does to its members. 
The hypothesis that there is a relationship between the performance 
of Pentecostal candidates and the type of their church assumes that the 
votes received by candidates come from their own congregations. How-
ever, there is evidence to suggest that some of their votes come from 
members of other churches.5 In Brazilian OLPR elections, the number 
                                                 
5  Maranhão representative and leader of Assembly of God Costa Ferreira states 
in an interview with Borges Jr. that “95% of his votes come from the Evangeli-
cal milieu” (Borges Jr. 2010: 75). Similarly, Representative Eliziane Gama, also 
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of candidates who use Evangelical titles (“bishops,” “pastors,” “apos-
tles,” etc.) in their official electoral names has grown. This increase sug-
gests that such a strategy could serve as a religious “cue” to attract Evan-
gelical voters, signaling the candidate’s Evangelical identity. The strategy 
could be explained by the characteristics of the Brazilian political system: 
high party fragmentation, parties with diluted “brands,” a high number 
of candidates (due to the high district magnitude), and expensive cam-
paigns. 
Whether because they receive their congregations’ votes or votes 
from Evangelicals to whom they signal their religious identity, Pentecos-
tal candidates running for legislative seats in Brazil could, in theory, 
count on winning a considerable share of votes and comparatively lower 
campaign expenses. The relationship between votes received and cam-
paign spending was investigated by Netto and Speck (2017). The authors 
used data from the 2014 elections for the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies 
and state legislative assemblies and considered all of those who used 
religious titles (“bishop,” “pastor,” etc.) in their electoral names to be 
Evangelical candidates. There is, however, a problem in using religious 
titles as a proxy for Evangelical candidates. Many Evangelicals do not 
use titles in their electoral names, and certainly the use of a religious title 
is not random, but rather correlated with other variables. Figure 1 (be-
low) shows the dispersion of the percent of valid votes for Evangelical 
candidates in the 2014 election for the Chamber of Deputies. 
Candidates are divided between those who use religious titles in 
their electoral names (value 1) and those who do not (value 0). The per-
centage of votes for Evangelical candidates without religious titles is 
superior to those with titles. The top quartile (the upper part of the box) 
of Evangelicals without titles far exceeds the maximum value of Evan-
gelicals with titles. I considered only candidates who had 0.02 percent or 
more of the votes in the election (which totals 150 Evangelicals). How-
ever, if one considers the total number of Evangelical candidates, the 
difference between the two groups would be even greater. It is not ra-
tional to assume that candidates choose to use religious titles that will 
cause them to lose votes. The most plausible hypothesis, on the contrary, 
is that religious titles are a resource used by less competitive Evangelical 
candidates, being unnecessary (or even counterproductive) for the more 
competitive ones. 
                                                                                                    
from AG of Maranhão, says that “90% of its voters are also Evangelicals” 
(Borges Jr. 2010: 75). The statements are unclear, but suggest that the AG con-
gresspeople would receive votes not only from AG constituents, but also from 
other Evangelical voters. 
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Figure 1. Votes for Evangelical Candidates 
 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
In this way, any model that uses religious titles as a proxy for Evangelical 
candidates will be biased. The example of the UCKG corroborates this: 
in 2014, from 19 candidates supported by the church for the federal 
legislature, only two used religious titles. 
Theory and Hypotheses: Pentecostals,  
Churches, and Campaign Spending 
An ideal experiment measuring the causal effect of being supported by a 
Pentecostal church on electoral performance would need to randomly 
assign, in any given district, the support of identical Pentecostal churches 
(the treatment group) to a given group of candidates and compare their 
performance with that of another group who had not received such 
support (control group). For several reasons, this research design is un-
feasible. People do not convert to Pentecostalism in a random way, nor 
do they ascend randomly in the church hierarchy. Therefore, official 
support from the church is not given randomly. In addition, there is 
extreme diversity among the Brazilian Pentecostal churches. They differ 
in terms of territorial extension; number of churches, pastors, and con-
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gregations; and doctrine and theological vision, among other factors. 
Thus, support for candidates is neither random nor given by identical 
churches. 
Instead, I offer an observational study based on electoral data from 
the federal and state legislatures, through which I intend to estimate the 
effect of being supported by a Pentecostal church on electoral perfor-
mance. To date, the difficulty in obtaining data on Evangelical candi-
dates, as well as their relationship with churches, has prevented research-
ers from successfully addressing the electoral effect of churches’ support 
with multivariate analyses. Based on new data (detailed in the next sec-
tion), I intend to contribute to filling this gap. 
Assuming there is a positive association between being a Pentecos-
tal candidate and electoral performance, the phenomenon could be ex-
plained in different ways: One basic explanation relies on Evangelical 
identity. Social identities based on race, gender, and religion, among 
other grouping factors, may generate political cohesion and be relevant 
to electoral contests (Huddy 2013; Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 
2002). There is evidence that, in addition to candidates and parties, social 
groups are one of the main ways in which individuals organize their 
general political cognition (Miller, Wlezien, and Hildreth 1991). In the 
case of Brazilian legislative elections, the use of religious titles in electoral 
names would be an example of how certain candidates seek to signal 
their Evangelical identity to voters. 
A second explanation is based on the support that a church offers 
to its “official” candidate, giving him a more or less assured contingent 
of votes (or facilitating access to that contingent). The church leaders – 
pastors and bishops – promote the candidate to the faithful in a variety 
of ways, for instance by taking him or her to the pulpit, placing banners 
with his or her photos in or near the church, presenting him or her to 
the churchgoers in personal meetings, and distributing political flyers 
(Oro 2003b; Santos 2013; Valle 2013; Barbosa 2015). Since the church is 
an institution that encompasses several spheres of the lives of the faith-
ful, it is understandable that the confidence entrusted to the institution is 
easily transmitted to the candidates supported by it. In addition, the 
sectarian structure of each Pentecostal church makes them inclined to 
seek to keep the faithful within their church and likely to oppose their 
members’ participation in spheres beyond the church’s control (Freston 
1993). This contributes to a high attendance at Pentecostal places of 
worship vis-à-vis those of other religions (Bohn 2004). 
The support of a church led to the emergence of a new type of 
Evangelical candidate, whose historical emergence was set out in the 
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1980s during redemocratization (Freston 1993). While it is theoretically 
possible to think of the two explanations above (religious identity and 
church support) as distinct, the distinction is made more difficult in 
practice, since “official” church candidates can receive votes from Evan-
gelicals belonging to other churches, and unofficial candidates can win 
votes from churches that “officially” support another candidate. 
In any case, the two basic explanations for the positive association 
between being a Pentecostal candidate and good electoral performance 
allow different conjectures about the campaign spending of these candi-
dates. It may be argued that, whether through “religious cues” or 
through official church support, Pentecostal candidates need to spend 
proportionately less money on their campaigns. However, it would also 
be plausible to bring forth a competing explanation – namely, that Pen-
tecostal candidates receive more resources from parties and/or donors 
with the expectation that (in comparison to other candidates) they would 
more easily convert resources into votes. It should be noted, then, that 
the two explanations suppose that Pentecostal candidates have a com-
paratively lower voting cost than other candidates – or at least a voting 
cost that makes them competitive candidates for the elections (see Table 
1 below). 
Table 1. Average Spending/Vote Ratio (in BRL) in 2014 Elections 
  Chamber Assemblies 
All candidates 13.15 14.21 
Evangelicals 10.00 8.59 
Assembly of God 8.64 8.29 
Church of the Foursquare Gospel 8.36 9.00 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 4.57 3.79 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
Therefore, one conjecture to be tested is whether Pentecostal candidates 
collect (and, by extension, spend) more or less money than the other 
candidates. A second conjecture concerns the difference between Evan-
gelical and Pentecostal candidates. Official support from Pentecostal 
churches is an institutional resource that can make the candidates of 
these churches more competitive by offering them facilitated access to a 
contingent of voters. This should differentiate official Pentecostal candi-
dates from Evangelical candidates. Thus, it is plausible to suppose that 
being an official Pentecostal candidate has a positive effect on the num-
ber of votes received, and that this effect is greater than that of being a 
non-Pentecostal Evangelical. 
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As discussed in the previous section, Pentecostal church support is 
a resource related to the church type. Thus, a third conjecture would be 
that churches with greater structure, decision-making centralization, and 
emphasis on candidate support will have a greater effect than other 
churches on candidates’ electoral performance (Rodrigues and Fuks 
2015). From this reasoning, I present below, in a simplified way, the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
 
Hypothesis 1. Being a Pentecostal candidate has a negative effect on 
campaign spending. 
Hypothesis 2a. Being a Pentecostal candidate has a positive effect 
on the number of votes received. 
Hypothesis 2b. Being a Pentecostal candidate has a greater effect on 
the number of votes received than that of being a non-Pente-
costal Evangelical candidate. 
Hypothesis 3. Being a Pentecostal candidate supported by a church 
with larger structure, decision-making centralization, and empha-
sis on support has a greater effect on the number of votes re-
ceived than being a candidate of other churches. 
Data 
The data set used here comes from two sources. The electoral data, in-
cluding most of the independent and control variables, come from the 
Tribunal Superior Eleitoral (TSE). However, in order to test the afore-
mentioned hypotheses, I had to complement this data with information 
from the linkage between candidates and churches. This implied a dedi-
cated effort of more than one year of data collecting that could not be 
automatized. More than 17,000 candidates ran for federal and legislative 
seats in Brazil in 2014. Although it is relatively easy to identify elected 
Evangelical candidates, the same cannot be said for the non-elected. 
Some Pentecostal churches do not publicize their (often illegal) support 
for candidates. The churches’ National Registry of Legal Entities (Cadas-
tro Nacional da Pessoa Jurídica, CNPJ) is not helpful, because most 
Evangelical candidates are not church employees.6 Hence, I had to rely 
on different strategies for identifying Evangelical candidates and their 
linkages to churches. 
First, I examined the literature on Evangelicals and elections in Bra-
zil, which offers valuable information on Evangelical politicians. Second, 
                                                 
6  I thank Claudia Cerqueira for bringing this fact to my attention. 
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I utilized the information contained in the TSE data about candidates’ 
occupations and their electoral names. Many Evangelical candidates with 
ecclesial positions declare their occupation as “priest or member of reli-
gious order or sect.” In addition, many also use religious titles in their 
electoral names. Third, I contacted the churches. Few, however, contrib-
uted to the research; most ignored my requests for information about 
which candidates they supported in elections. Fourth, I searched news-
papers and internet news sites that had information about the religious 
identity and/or church to which the candidate was linked. 
While the identification of Evangelical candidates can be difficult, 
and some of them may have not been identified, there are reasons that 
allow a strong degree of confidence in the data used here. First, the so-
cial profile of Evangelicals makes it very plausible that, like other minori-
ties, they are underrepresented as a share of the total number of candi-
dates. Therefore, almost certainly a smaller share of the more than 
17,000 candidates would be Evangelical than the share of Evangelicals in 
the overall population.  
Second, as the literature has pointed out, the phenomenon of 
Evangelical political representation is to a large extent a product of 
church-sponsored Pentecostal candidates (Freston 1993; Reich and San-
tos 2013; Cerqueira 2017). Church corporate representation is a phe-
nomenon circumscribed to a few large Pentecostals churches (mostly the 
AG, UCKG, and CFG). These are highly centralized churches that do 
not encourage the political participation of the laity as candidates (except 
of those members “officially” endorsed by the churches). Few “unoffi-
cial” laypersons of these churches will become candidates. The fact that 
the vast majority of candidates linked to large churches are corporate 
candidates makes their identification much easier. At the same time, 
other churches, such as the Christian Congregation in Brazil and the 
God Is Love Pentecostal Church, do not encourage any kind of individ-
ual member participation in electoral politics. One would probably find 
no candidates representing them. Hence, a significant share of Pentecos-
tal voters probably does not have representatives among political candi-
dates. 
Third, several case studies reinforce the conjecture that Pentecostal 
churches support relatively few candidates per state, which is in accord-
ance with the data used here (Oro 2003b; Schoenfelder and Paz 2006; 
Cuyabano 2009; Borges Jr. 2010; Valle 2013). In any given state, the 
number of church-sponsored candidates will be limited by the church’s 
total number of followers registered to vote and willing to support its 
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candidates, as well as by the district’s minimum share of valid votes nec-
essary to get elected.  
It is necessary to stress that despite the exhaustive work of identify-
ing Evangelical candidates and their respective churches, it is still diffi-
cult to identify whether or not a Pentecostal candidate was “officially” 
supported by his church, and to discern what differentiates a candidate 
with official support from one who, without official support, tries to win 
the votes of his congregation. Such a difficulty does not exist in the case 
of the UCKG, since it does not permit unofficial challengers, but it is 
considerable in the case of the AG, Brazil’s largest Pentecostal church. I 
opted to identify the candidates “associated” with the churches; alt-
hough, in many cases, I do not know precisely if the connection involved 
official support or not. Strictly speaking, I am assuming that candidates 
associated with Pentecostal churches can be a proxy for Pentecostal 
“official candidates.” 
The data set units of analysis are the candidates. The total number 
of candidates for the Chamber was 4,942, and for the state legislative 
assemblies, 12,589. An initial matter to be taken into consideration con-
cerns which candidates should be included in the analysis. Using all the 
candidates for federal and state legislatures in the 2014 elections would 
imply considering in the analysis even those non-competitive candidates 
who received few or no votes and few or no resources for their cam-
paigns. As noted by Samuels (2001a), most of the contestants in the US 
and Brazilian legislative elections are largely irrelevant. However, if they 
were included in the analysis, they would create a bias towards increasing 
incumbent advantage, since incumbents would be compared to all other 
candidates. For this reason, Samuels argues, only competitive candidates 
should be considered. 
But the problem is not just the bias in favor of the incumbents. It is 
a broader one and concerns to what extent certain observations should 
influence the estimation of the regression parameters. Let us suppose 
two candidates, A and B, both ran for a seat as federal representative for 
São Paulo. Candidate A declared campaign spending of BRL 5 and got 
10 votes. Candidate B, in turn, declared an expenditure of BRL 170,000 
and obtained 12,000 votes. In terms of electoral success, it is clear that 
the relation between spending and voting of the first candidate (A) is far 
from the true relation between spending and voting in the district in 
question. However, if it is included in the analysis, it will influence the 
parameter estimation. 
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To circumvent this issue, I opted to work with a sample containing 
only those candidates who received 0.08 percent or more of the total 
valid votes in their districts. It should be remembered that, in Brazilian 
OLPR legislative elections, candidates are elected with much lower per-
centages than would be required in a majority contest. As an example, 
the candidates elected in 2014 with the lowest percentage of votes re-
ceived 0.1 percent of the valid votes for the Federal Chamber and 0.12 
percent for the state legislative assemblies. The limit of 0.08 percent is, 
therefore, well below the minimum percentage of votes of those who 
were elected. It excludes a considerable number of non-competitive 
candidates, but does not exclude any elected candidates and still allows 
for the presence of a significant contingent of unelected candidates. 
Limiting the data in this way also makes it more reliable. If there are 
cases of missing data (Evangelical candidates who could not be identi-
fied), they would certainly be located among the less competitive candi-
dates.7 
Among the candidates for the Chamber, I identified 186 Evangeli-
cals. Of that number, I was able to define 90 as Pentecostals and able to 
determine the church affiliation of 122. Among the candidates for the 
state legislative assemblies, I identified 338 Evangelicals, 113 of whom 
were Pentecostals; churches were identified for 156 of the candidates. 
For the sample of competitive candidates, the number of Evangelicals is 
smaller, as shown in Tables 2 and 3, below. However, it should be noted 
that the number of Pentecostals in the two samples is similar, which 
indicates that almost all Pentecostal candidates received a percentage 
equal to or greater than 0.08 percent valid votes in their respective dis-
tricts.  
Table 2. Total Number of Candidates, Evangelicals, and Pentecostals 
Office Total Evangeli-
cals 
Identified 
church 
Pentecos-
tals 
Federal representative 4,942 186 122 90 
State representative 12,589 338 156 113 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
  
                                                 
7  Tables with OLS models containing all candidates are presented in the Appen-
dix. I found small differences in some of the controls, but most of the inde-
pendent variables remained the same. The exception is the “Pentecostal” varia-
ble, which becomes positive in the models containing all candidates. However, 
it still has a low effect on spending.  
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Table 3. Sample Containing Only Candidates with  0.08 Percent of Votes 
Office Total Evangeli-
cals 
Identified 
church 
Pentecos-
tals 
Federal representative 1,933 130 112 85 
State representative 4,162 171 138 106 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
Dependent Variables 
Campaign Spending 
This is a dependent variable for the test of the first research hypothesis 
and an independent variable for the other hypotheses. Campaign spend-
ing is a key aspect of candidates’ electoral performance.8 In the case of 
the analysis of the Pentecostal candidates, it is necessary to investigate to 
what extent they collect more or less money than other candidates. Like 
Samuels (2001a, 2002b) and Speck and Mancuso (2014), I chose to de-
fine this variable as the percentage of spending, meaning the percentage 
of each candidate’s total campaign expenditure in a particular district.9 
Votes 
This is the dependent variable that will be used in the test of most hy-
potheses, and that measures the candidates’ electoral performance. I 
chose to set it as the percentage of valid votes each candidate received in 
his or her district. Another possibility would be to work with a binary 
dependent variable that would distinguish those who were elected from 
those who were not. Although there are good arguments for using a 
binary variable (see, for example, Speck and Mancuso 2014), my goal in 
this study can be best achieved by working with a continuous variable.  
The use of a binary variable would end up disregarding candidates’ 
ability to perform well even if they are not elected. In Brazilian legislative 
elections, the best non-elected candidates become “substitutes” (suplentes) 
                                                 
8  For a good partial review of the literature on campaign spending, see Stratman 
(2005). For a good review of the Brazilian case, see Mancuso (2015). 
9  It is worth mentioning that, in 2014, the Brazilian Federal Police began an 
investigation (called “Lava Jato”), which has since revealed one of the largest 
corruption scandals in the world. Investigations revealed that a considerable 
percentage of Brazilian politicians (whether from executive or legislative 
branches) were elected using illegal financing. To date, however, as far as I 
know, there are no studies measuring the impact of the now known illegal fi-
nancing on the candidates’ performances. 
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– that is, they head a list of those who will take up a position if and when 
those who were elected resign their mandates to take on other positions. 
It would be difficult not to consider a good “suplência” as a good electoral 
performance. This situation is properly captured when working with a 
continuous variable, but would not be captured with a binary variable. 
Take, for example, the case of the UCKG in the Brazilian state of Mato 
Grosso in 2006 (see Cuyabano 2009). The church supported two candi-
dates for the Legislative Assembly of Mato Grosso and one for the Fed-
eral Chamber of Deputies. None of them was elected. However, they all 
received a good number of votes and good positions as substitutes (in 
fact, one of them was the third substitute). A second justification for 
using the percentage of valid votes in opposition to the “elected” and 
“non-elected” categories is that, in elections for Brazilian legislatures, 
candidates do not depend only on themselves. The possibility of elec-
toral coalitions in high-magnitude districts with OLPR means that some 
candidates receive comparatively fewer votes but are still elected thanks 
to the coalition votes. This would be a problem if the variable were bina-
ry, but it will not be a problem as long as the variable is continuous.  
Independent Variables 
In this study, I use three main independent variables, all binary. The first 
and most comprehensive identifies whether or not the candidate is an 
Evangelical. The second and most important is whether the candidate is 
linked to a Pentecostal church, which I use as a proxy to identify wheth-
er or not the candidate is supported by a Pentecostal church. The proxy 
is necessary because, as mentioned above, it is not always possible to 
distinguish candidates supported de facto by churches from those who, 
although related to them in some way, did not receive support. Table 4, 
below, shows the Pentecostal churches included in the variable and the 
number of candidates attached to them. 
Finally, the third independent variable identifies whether or not the 
candidate is supported by the UCKG. It will be used to test Hypothesis 
3: if being a Pentecostal candidate for a church with a larger structure, 
decision-making center, and emphasis on support for political candidates 
has a greater effect on the number of votes than being a candidate for 
other churches. The UCKG is the best choice for this, since it is the best 
example identified by the Pentecostal literature of a large church with a 
centralized structure and emphatic support for its candidates. Each of 
these three variables – Evangelical, Pentecostal, and member of the 
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UCKG – presents a value of “1” when candidates belong to the interest 
categories and “0” when they do not. 
Table 4. Pentecostal Candidates per Church 
Church Chamber Assemblies 
Assembly of God 42 58 
Universal Church of the Kingdom of God 19 23 
Church of the Foursquare Gospel 8 9 
World Church of the Power of God 4 9 
International Church of the Grace of God 4 3 
Maranata 3 2 
Heal Our Land 2 2 
Reborn in Christ 1 0 
Brazil For Christ 1 0 
New Life Church 1 0 
TOTAL 85 106 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
Control Variables 
While the argument presented here is focused on the impact of being a 
Pentecostal candidate on campaign spending and electoral performance, 
other factors may affect that relationship. One important factor is the 
use of a religious title. Many Evangelical and Pentecostal candidates use 
religious titles (“pastor,” “bishop,” “apostle,” etc.) in their electoral 
names to attract Evangelical voters. As I have argued, the use of religious 
titles is not random, but is more often used by less competitive candi-
dates, presumably to activate their Evangelical identity. The strategy of 
electorally focusing on Evangelical voters, even if it makes one lose votes 
among non-Evangelicals (see Boas 2014), is rational in an OLPR system 
with a high number of competitors. I included in the models a dummy 
variable to identify candidates who use religious titles. Approximately 25 
percent of Pentecostal candidates for the Federal Chamber used religious 
titles. In the case of state legislative assemblies, the corresponding share 
was 38.4 percent. 
In the literature on legislative elections, perhaps the most important 
factor for the performance of candidates is incumbency. Jacobson (1978, 
1985, 1990) argued that, in US elections, challengers must spend more 
money on their campaigns than incumbents, and that the challenger’s 
spending has a stronger effect on his performance than the incumbent’s 
on his. In the case of Brazil, the discussion also exists. Samuels (2001a, 
2001b) found no significant difference between the effect of spending 
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on the two groups. Speck and Mancuso (2014), however, suggest there is 
a difference: spending tends to be more significant for Brazilian chal-
lengers than for incumbents. Lemos, Marcelino, and Pederiva (2010) also 
stress that incumbents receive and spend more money than incumbents.  
It is important to remember that in the Brazilian OPLR electoral 
system several incumbents and several challengers compete within each 
district. In the 2014 legislative elections for the state of São Paulo, for 
example, the contests for federal deputy included more than 1,000 chal-
lengers and 58 incumbents (the state has 70 representatives). It is true 
that most of the challengers are uncompetitive candidates. Still, in theo-
ry, Brazilian incumbents need to compete with each other and with sev-
eral competitive challengers. 
The importance of incumbency is justified by two basic assump-
tions that are, to some extent, related: The first is that incumbent candi-
dates can use their resources during their terms to become known to 
voters, which allows them to start the electoral campaign ahead of their 
rivals. The second is that incumbents are presumably stronger candidates 
with greater political capital, whether due to their personal charisma, 
their political ability, or other factors. However, in the case of Brazil, it 
can be assumed that many candidates with greater political capital are not 
necessarily already part of the legislative branch. It is common, for ex-
ample, for former mayors to compete for seats in state and federal legis-
latures. The Brazilian political system offers incentives such that politi-
cians do not necessarily seek to build careers in legislatures (Leoni, Perei-
ra, and Rennó 2003). Offices in the local and state executives can be 
more interesting than a seat in a state legislative assembly or even in the 
Chamber of Deputies, since more power is concentrated in them and 
they provide greater political payoff. So, it seems reasonable to take into 
account not only whether the candidates are incumbent, but also wheth-
er they have already been mayors. Thus, I added to the models two 
dummy variables, one to identify incumbents, and another to identify 
those candidates who were elected mayors in 2004 and/or 2008. Just 
over one-third of Pentecostal candidates competing in 2014 were in-
cumbents, but only two of them were former mayors. 
Another important factor to consider is the candidate performance 
in the previous election. It is true that, of the total number of candidates 
analyzed, only a small fraction are seeking reelection. Most did not run in 
previous elections. However, it is possible to use as a control the per-
formance of the candidates’ parties in the last elections. This factor may 
account for holding voter preferences in their respective districts con-
stant. Thus, I include a control variable with the percentage of votes for 
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the candidate’s party in the 2010 elections. The percentages refer to the 
elections to the Chamber of Deputies, in the case of candidates for fed-
eral representative, and to the state legislative assemblies, in the case of 
candidates for state representative. It is worth emphasizing that most 
studies on the relation between spending and voting in the US congres-
sional elections use some kind of control for constituency preference 
(Stratman 2005).10  
The literature on the Brazilian case also highlights another relevant 
factor – namely, the party’s belonging to the federal coalition (Pereira 
and Rennó 2001, 2007; Leoni, Pereira, and Rennó 2003). The assump-
tion is that candidates would benefit from belonging to the federal gov-
ernment coalition, either for the benefits that membership could grant to 
their mandates in the case of candidates for reelection, or for a possible 
coattail effect that could benefit the candidates related to the coalition 
base.11 This reasoning could also be valid for state government coali-
tions, given the supposed power that Brazilian governors have over state 
and municipal political leaders (Abrúcio 1998). However, as Pereira and 
Rennó (2007) argue, the institutional changes that occurred throughout 
the 1990s, such as the end of state banks and the approval of the Fiscal 
Responsibility Law, have diminished the power of state governments, 
making their influence less certain. Thus, I included in the models only a 
dummy variable to control for belonging to the federal coalition in 2014. 
Another factor stressed by the literature that deserves attention is 
that of political parties. In the debate on the relationship between spend-
ing and voting in US congressional elections, the models incorporate 
variables specifying candidate parties (e.g., Jacobson 1978; Green and 
Krasno 1988). However, not all studies on the Brazilian case use parties 
as controls. The relevance of the party depends, of course, on what one 
wants to investigate. In the case of the relation between expenditure and 
vote, the candidate’s political party is a variable related to both spending 
and voting; therefore, it should be incorporated. However, the focus of 
this study is not exactly the relationship between spending and voting, 
but rather between being a Pentecostal “official candidate” and voting.  
                                                 
10  In the case of parties registered after 2010, such as the National Ecological 
Party (Partido Ecológico Nacional, PEN), the Republican Party of Social Order 
(Partido Republicano da Ordem Social, PROS), and Solidarity (Solidariedade, 
SD), the value attributed was “0.”  
11  It is worth remembering that, despite the fall in the popularity of President 
Dilma Rousseff between March and June 2013, she ended 2014 with relatively 
high approval ratings. See, for example, Agência de Notícias CNI 2014).  
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It is reasonable to suppose that the performance of Pentecostal 
candidates does not depend much on parties. The literature usually char-
acterizes Brazilian parties as weak and having diluted “brands” (Main-
waring 1992; Samuels and Zucco 2013). The exceptions would be the 
Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT) and, to a lesser extent, 
the Brazilian Social Democracy Party (Partido da Social Democracia 
Brasileira, PSDB) and the Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Par-
tido do Movimento Democrático Brasileiro, PMDB). However, as 
shown in Table 5 (below), Pentecostal candidates tend to be disseminat-
ed into small, comparatively unstructured parties with diffuse ideologies. 
These parties are, in general, center or center-right, but their “brands” 
signal little to voters. In addition, parties that host Pentecostal candidates 
are likely to contribute less to their candidates’ campaigns than stronger 
parties such as the PT or the PSDB. The literature’s characterization of 
Pentecostal candidates implies that they are little dependent on their 
parties, since in theory they could count on their “electoral corrals.” 
These arguments could justify the exclusion of the parties from the sta-
tistical models of this study. However, based on Table 5, I chose to in-
clude dummies only for the parties with the highest concentration of 
Pentecostal candidates: the Brazilian Republican Party (Partido Republi-
cano Brasileiro, PRB) and the Social Christian Party (Partido Social Cris-
tão, PSC). 
Finally, I add to the models control variables for gender, race, and 
age. The first two are dummies and the last one is continuous. In the 
case of gender, the variable assumes a value of “1” for women and “0” 
for men. In the case of race, it assumes “1” for black or brown (pardo) 
people and “0” for others.12 It is worth saying that, in the 2014 elections 
for federal and state legislatures, a quarter of the total number of candi-
dates were women. Among Pentecostal candidates, this proportion was 
just one tenth. Regarding race, the proportion of blacks and browns 
within the total number of candidates is similar to that found in the sub-
set of Pentecostal candidates (just under 40 percent in both groups). The 
underrepresentation of women and blacks in the Brazilian legislatures, as 
well as their lower potential for campaign financing (Sacchet and Speck 
2012), suggests the importance of including controls for gender and race 
in the models. 
  
                                                 
12  I use the term “brown” as a translation of “pardo,” which refers to Brazilians 
of mixed race. From now on in this article, the term “black” will cover both 
black and brown candidates.  
  24 Fábio Lacerda 
 
Table 5. Pentecostal Candidates per Party 
No. of can-
didates 
Federal Chamber State legislative assemblies 
1 PMN, PPS, PROS, PSDC, 
PTC, PTN, PV 
PMN, PP, PPS, PSDC, PSL 
2 PDT, PEN, PP, PRP, PRTB, 
PTdoB, PHS, PSB 
SD 
3 PSD, PSDB, SD PDT, PHS, PTC 
4 to 6 DEM, PMDB, PR, PTB PEN, PRP, PSB, PSDB, PTB, 
PTN, DEM, PR, PROS 
7 to 10 - PMDB 
11 to 15 PSC PSD 
16 to 20 - PSC 
21 to 25 PRB PRB 
Note:  The parties shown are the following: National Mobilization Party (Partido da 
Mobilização Nacional, PMN), Socialist Popular Party (Partido Popular Socialis-
ta, PPS), Social Order Republican Party (Partido Republicano da Ordem Soci-
al, PROS), Christian Social Democrat Party (Partido Social Democrata Cristão, 
PSDC), Christian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Cristão, PTC), National 
Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Nacional, PTN), Green Party (Partido Verde, 
PV), Popular Party (Partido Popular, PP), Liberal Social Party (Partido Social 
Liberal, PSL), Labour Democratic Party (Partido Democrático Trabalhista, 
PDT), National Ecological Party (Partido Ecológico Nacional, PEN), Progressi-
ve Republican Party (Partido Republicano Progressista, PRP), Brazilian La-
bour Renewal Party (Partido Renovador Trabalhista Brasileiro, PRTB), Brazil’s 
Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista do Brasil, PTdoB), Solidarity’s Humanist 
Party (Partido Humanista da Solidariedade, PHS), Brazilian Socialist Party 
(Partido Socialista Brasileiro, PSB), Solidarity (Solidariedade, SD), Democratic 
Social Party (Partido Social Democrático, PSD), Brazilian Social Democracy 
Party (Partido da Social Democracia Brasileira, PSDB), Democrats (Democra-
tas, DEM), Brazilian Democratic Movement Party (Partido do Movimento De-
mocrático Brasileiro, PMDB), Republic Party (Partido da República, PR), Bra-
zilian Labour Party (Partido Trabalhista Brasileiro, PTB), Social Christian Party 
(Partido Social Cristão, PSC), and Brazilian Republican Party (Partido Repu-
blicano Brasileiro, PRB). 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
Results 
In order to test the hypotheses stated above, I use OLS regressions to 
estimate three models, replicated for the Federal Chamber (Table 6) and 
state legislative assemblies (Table 7). Model 1 is used to test the first 
hypothesis, that being a Pentecostal candidate would have a negative 
impact on campaign spending. The dependent variable of Model 1 is the 
percentage of expenditure. Model 2 refers to the second hypothesis, that 
being a Pentecostal candidate would have (a) a positive effect on the 
number of votes, and (b) a greater effect on the number of votes than 
being Evangelical. The dependent variable is the percentage of votes. 
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Finally, Model 3 is used to test the third hypothesis, that being a Pente-
costal candidate for a church with a larger structure, more centralization, 
and more emphasis on support would have a greater effect on the num-
ber of votes than being a candidate for other churches.  
Table 6. OLS Regression Models for the Chamber of Deputies 
Dependent variable: 
(%) Spend (%) Vote 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(%) Spend  0.470*** (0.012) 
0.470*** 
(0.012) 
Incumbent 2.036*** (0.136) 
0.640*** 
(0.078) 
0.631*** 
(0.077) 
Ex-mayor 0.738*** (0.247) 
0.616*** 
(0.133) 
0.607*** 
(0.133) 
(%) 2010 Party voting  0.014** (0.005) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
0.013*** 
(0.004) 
Pentecostal 0.149 (0.276) 
0.637*** 
(0.235) 
 
Evangelical  0.162 (0.211) 
 
Religious title  0.169 (0.250) 
0.095 
(0.224) 
(Pentecostal  UCKG)   0.544*** (0.170) 
UCKG   0.809*** (0.289) 
Federal coalition 0.431*** (0.119) 
0.025 
(0.064) 
 
Woman 0.06 (0.155) 
0.038 
(0.083) 
0.043 
(0.083) 
Black 0.316*** (0.070) 
0.017 
(0.061) 
0.021 
(0.061) 
Age 0.002 (0.004) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
PSC 0.236 (0.329) 
0.013 
(0.177) 
0.050 
(0.175) 
PRB 0.424 (0.421) 
0.426** 
(0.179) 
 
Constant 0.797*** (0.243) 
0.778*** 
(0.131) 
0.804*** 
(0.130) 
N 1933 1933 1933 
R2 0.154 0.537 0.539 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. * for p<0.1; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01. 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
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Again, the dependent variable is the percentage of votes. Each of the 
models is presented in two versions, one for the Federal Chamber, the 
other for the assemblies. 
Table 7. OLS Regression Models for the State Legislative Assemblies 
Dependent variable: 
(%) Spend (%) Vote 
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(%) Spend  0.462*** (0.008) 
0.463*** 
(0.008) 
Incumbent 0.717*** (0.031) 
0.408*** 
(0.018) 
0.404*** 
(0.018) 
Ex-mayor 0.252*** (0.049) 
0.186*** 
(0.027) 
0.186*** 
(0.027) 
(%) 2010 Party voting  0.009*** (0.002) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
Pentecostal 0.090 (0.074) 
0.359*** 
(0.064) 
 
Evangelical  0.101* (0.059) 
 
Religious title  0.132** (0.064) 
0.071 
(0.053) 
(Pentecostal  UCKG)   0.264*** (0.048) 
UCKG   0.459*** (0.087) 
Federal coalition 0.057** (0.024) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
 
Woman 0.051 (0.034) 
0.022 
(0.019) 
0.020 
(0.019) 
Black 0.057** (0.024) 
0.019 
(0.013) 
0.021 
(0.013) 
Age 0.003 (0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
PSC 0.010 (0.065) 
0.004 
(0.036) 
0.006 
(0.035) 
PRB 0.064 (0.073) 
0.129*** 
(0.040) 
 
Constant 0.560*** (0.055) 
0.281*** 
(0.031) 
0.292*** 
(0.030) 
N 4162 4162 4162 
R2 0.146 0.557 0.556 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. * for p<0.1; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01. 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
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The main variable for the first model is “Pentecostal,” which specifies 
whether or not the candidate is supported by a Pentecostal church. The 
results suggest a low and negative effect of being Pentecostal on ex-
penditure for both the Chamber and the state legislative assemblies. 
However, neither of them is statistically significant. 
The second hypothesis finds support in Model 2. In this case, the 
variables of major interest are “Pentecostal” and “Evangelical.” Regard-
ing Hypothesis 2a, there is a strong positive and statistically significant 
effect (always at 0.01) of being Pentecostal on the percentage of votes, 
for both the Chamber and the assemblies. The effect holds even when 
incumbency, candidate party’s performance in previous elections (2010), 
belonging to the federal government coalition, gender, race, age, religious 
title, and even the parties with the highest number of Pentecostal candi-
dates – the PRB and PSC – are controlled for. 
Hypothesis 2b supposes the comparison between the coefficients of 
“Pentecostal” and “Evangelical.” As summarized in Figure 2, the confi-
dence intervals of the Chamber coefficients overlap slightly. However, a 
Wald test reveals that the hypothesis of coefficient equality can be reject-
ed at a significance level of 10 percent (Prob > F = 0.0562).13  
Figure 2. Estimated Effect of Being Evangelical or Pentecostal on Vote 
(Model 2) 
 
Note:  Lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
The assemblies’ coefficients do not overlap, indicating that the difference 
between them is statistically significant (see StatNews #73 2008). Hence, 
                                                 
13  All Wald tests were made with the post-estimation command of Stata 12. 
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the results corroborate the conjecture that the effect of being a Pentecos-
tal candidate is different from that of being Evangelical. 
The third hypothesis, tested with Model 3, states that the type of 
church is relevant to the effect of being a Pentecostal candidate. A 
church with greater structure, centralization, and emphasis on support 
would have a greater effect than other churches on candidates’ votes. To 
test this conjecture, I compared the effect of being Pentecostal to the 
effect of being supported by the UCKG. For this comparison, I created 
a new variable, “Pentecostal – UCKG,” which is, as the name suggests, 
the same “Pentecostal” variable, but without candidates belonging to the 
UCKG. The reason is that, without this, it is not possible to obtain a 
coefficient for the variable “UCKG.”14  
Figure 3 presents the results. For both the Chamber and the state 
legislative assemblies, the coefficient of “UCKG” is higher than that of 
“Pentecostal – UCKG,” but their confidence intervals overlap. The 
result of the Wald test for the Federal Chamber reveals that the hypothe-
sis of equality between the coefficients cannot be rejected (Prob > F = 
0.4186). Regarding the state legislative assemblies, the hypothesis that the 
two coefficients are equal can be rejected at a significance level of 5 per-
cent (Prob > F = 0.0407).  
Figure 3. Estimated Effect of Being Pentecostal or Member of UCKG on 
Vote (Model 3) 
 
Note:  Lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
                                                 
14  I also opted not to include controls for the PRB and belonging to the federal 
coalition simply because all UCKG candidates were in the PRB, and the PRB, 
in turn, was part of the federal coalition. 
  Strength of Pentecostal Churches’ Electoral Support 29
 

 
Thus, in the case of Hypothesis 3, the effect of being a candidate sup-
ported by the UCKG is greater than that of being supported by other 
churches, but the difference between the effects is statistically significant 
only for the assemblies.  
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the results of the coefficients of 
the control variables for the Chamber and state legislative assemblies 
were similar. For all models, the effect of campaign spending was posi-
tive and significant. The same goes for incumbency and being a former 
mayor. The percentage of the party’s votes in the last election has a posi-
tive and significant effect, yet almost null, for all Chamber models, but is 
negative and non-significant for Model 2 and Model 3 of the assemblies. 
Belonging to the federal coalition has a positive effect and is statistically 
significant both for Chamber and assemblies, but only for the first mod-
el. Finally, it is worth mentioning that the effect of being a woman, in 
general, is low and presents no statistical significance. The same holds 
for the effect of being a black candidate. The exception is the first model 
for the Chamber, in which the coefficient of being black is strong, nega-
tive, and statistically significant. 
Qualitative Analysis 
One could object that I do not measure the support of the churches as 
an institutional resource, but rather certain skills (acquired or innate) of 
the Pentecostal candidates, such as personal charisma, social capital, and 
so on. Perhaps the identified effect of being a Pentecostal candidate on 
votes, despite all the controls used in the regression models, actually 
reveals certain capabilities of these candidates that would not have been 
properly controlled for. Perhaps they are the same capacities that made 
them rise in the hierarchies of their churches, for example. I do not deny 
that there are factors related to these candidates that have not been con-
trolled for in the above models. However, I will argue here that, despite 
the alleged abilities of Pentecostal candidates, their electoral performance 
is largely due to the support of the churches, and that the effect of being 
Pentecostal on the vote wanes or disappears when church support is 
absent. 
To this end, I offer in this section qualitative evidence of six Pente-
costal candidates who were elected with the support of their churches, 
split from them throughout their term, and still ran for reelection. Such 
evidence can serve as a counterfactual basis for thinking about what the 
performance of these candidates would have been if church support 
were absent. Each of them had a marked decline in their votes received, 
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and none of them were reelected. As far as I know, these are the only 
cases between 1998 and 2014 of Pentecostal politicians who have split 
with their church during their term. Therefore, as far as I know, there are 
no cases that have resulted in equal or better electoral performance. 
Magaly Machado: In 1998 Machado was elected state deputy for 
the Liberal Front Party (Partido da Frente Liberal, PFL) with the support 
of the UCKG. She received 33,678 votes (0.47 percent of valid votes). In 
2002 she ceased to be supported by the UCKG and got the support of 
the much smaller New Life Church. She also switched from the PFL to 
PSB. Still, she ran for a seat in the Chamber of Deputies. She received 
9,418 votes (0.12 percent) and was not elected (see Oro 2003b). 
Heriberto da Silva Farias: In 1998 “Pastor Heriberto” (PMDB) 
won a seat in the Legislative Assembly of Ceará with the support of the 
UCKG. The candidate obtained 43,904 votes, or 1.61 percent of the 
valid votes. However, in 2002 he ran for reelection with another party 
(PL) and without church support. The pastor was not reelected, obtain-
ing only 1,338 votes (0.04 percent) (see Oro 2003b).  
Paulo Cesar de Velasco: De Velasco (PRONA), a candidate sup-
ported by the UCKG, was elected federal deputy by the Brazilian state of 
São Paulo in 1998, having received 94,880 votes (0.61 percent of valid 
votes). There is no precise evidence of date or circumstance, but at some 
point during his term the politician broke with the UCKG (see Souza 
2009). In 2002 he decided to run for a seat in the Legislative Assembly of 
São Paulo with another party (PSL), this time obtaining only 2,158 votes 
(0.01 percent), not getting reelected. 
Nataniel Nazareno Ferreira: Known as “Nataniel de Jesus” 
(PMDB), the candidate was elected state deputy for the Brazilian state of 
Mato Grosso in 2002 and received 12,848 votes, or 1.0 percent of valid 
votes. He was an official candidate of the UCKG (see Cuyabano 2009). 
The deputy was expelled from the church, but nevertheless attempted 
reelection in 2006. His performance was much worse than in the previ-
ous election and he was not reelected: he obtained only 4,286 votes, or 
0.3 percent of the valid votes. 
Denílson Segóvia: In 2010 “Pastor Denílson” (PSC) was elected as 
a deputy to the Legislative Assembly of Acre with the official support of 
the CFG, of which he was a pastor and state president. The candidate 
obtained 2,939 votes. However, according to media reports, Segovia was 
expelled from the church in 2013 (see AC24Horas 2013). In 2014 he 
sought reelection with another party (PEN), but obtained only 1,133 
votes (0.28 percent) and was not reelected. 
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Zacarias Vilharba: In 2010 “Vilalba de Jesus” (PRB) ran for feder-
al deputy in Pernambuco, a state in northeastern Brazil. He had the sup-
port of the UCKG. Although he was not elected, he obtained the second 
suplência and a significant number of votes (39,173). In 2014 the candi-
date sought reelection without church support (see Inaldo Sampaio – CBN 
2014). He switched from the PRB to the PP and changed his electoral 
name to “Pastor Vilalba.” His performance was much worse than in the 
previous election: he obtained 11,199 votes (0.25 percent), which guaran-
teed him neither the election nor a good position as suplente. 
Conclusions 
According to some of the literature on Pentecostal growth and politics in 
Latin America, the entry of Pentecostal churches into politics is detri-
mental to democracy. By having control over the votes of their congre-
gation members, Pentecostal leaders could get themselves or others 
elected to legislatures, thereby benefiting their churches from parochial 
bills. Such an argument is based on the assumption that Pentecostal 
candidates would gain a considerable degree of support from their 
churches. 
This work contributes to a better understanding of the relationship 
between churches, candidates, and legislative elections in Brazil. Drawing 
on new data, I offer important quantitative evidence to evaluate the 
above argument and others in the literature on Pentecostalism and poli-
tics. It is the first work to use data for Evangelical candidates other than 
those based on religious titles. As has been seen, the use of religious 
titles is a resource used mostly by less competitive candidates. Most 
competitive Pentecostal candidates do not rely on it, which indicates that 
identifying Pentecostal candidates only by means of the titles in their 
electoral names will necessarily lead to biased models. 
The literature review made clear the importance of investigating the 
relationship between campaign spending and election performance. I 
argued that, from a theoretical point of view, it is plausible that Pente-
costal candidates could spend more or less on their campaigns than oth-
er candidates. I then showed that Pentecostals of the Assembly of God, 
the Church of the Foursquare Gospel, and the UCKG have a compara-
tively lower voting cost than other candidates, with the UCKG’s voting 
cost being considerably lower than that of other churches. The vote of 
Pentecostal candidates costs less than the others, and that of the UCKG 
candidates costs less than all other Pentecostals. 
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Through OLS regression models, I tested whether there was a nega-
tive relationship between being a Pentecostal candidate and campaign 
spending. The results suggest that the relationship is indeed negative, but 
not statistically significant. When controlling for incumbency, previous 
party performance, and belonging to the federal coalition, among other 
factors, being a Pentecostal does not have a significant effect on ex-
penditure. 
Then I inquired whether there would be an effect of being Pente-
costal on votes received, and whether such an effect would be superior 
to that of being an Evangelical candidate. The results confirm the two 
hypotheses. The effect of being a Pentecostal candidate on votes re-
ceived is strong even when controlling for factors such as incumbency, 
spending, previous party performance, belonging to the federal coalition, 
gender, race, age, and belonging to the PRB or PSC. There is, therefore, 
strong evidence to confirm the conjecture that the support of Pentecos-
tal churches contributes significantly to the electoral performance of 
their candidates. This could also explain why Pentecostals are less un-
derrepresented in Brazilian legislatures than other minorities.  
To reinforce my argument, I offered qualitative evidence for coun-
terfactual reasoning: How would Pentecostal candidates perform were 
church support absent? Between 1998 and 2014, there were at least six 
cases of Pentecostal candidates who, elected with the support of their 
churches, broke with them over the term, but nevertheless decided to 
run for reelection. All of them had considerably lower performances, and 
none was reelected. 
It is also important to note that, while holding constant the effect of 
being Pentecostal, the effect of being Evangelical on the vote is negative 
for both the Chamber and the state legislative assemblies – though not 
statistically significant. This result is intuitive and may indicate that, con-
trolling for the effect of being supported by a Pentecostal church, being 
Evangelical does not bring any electoral benefit to the candidate. 
Through Model 3, I also tried to test whether the type and structure 
of the church matters in supporting candidates. To this end, I investigat-
ed whether the effect of being supported by the UCKG would be greater 
than the effect of being Pentecostal. The effect is, in fact, greater, alt-
hough the difference between them is statistically significant only in the 
tests for the assemblies. The low number of UCKG candidates causes 
the standard error of the coefficient to be high. Even so, the evidence 
gathered here is in line with the conjecture that churches with greater 
structure and centralization contribute more to the electoral performance 
  Strength of Pentecostal Churches’ Electoral Support 33
 

 
of their candidates than do the other churches, in addition to having a 
lower voting cost. 
Evangelicals owe their growth in the Federal Chamber and state leg-
islative assemblies to church-sponsored Pentecostal candidates. Church-
es that have adopted the corporate model of political representation have 
been remarkably successful (Lacerda 2017). The evidence presented here 
reinforces the importance of church support for Pentecostal candidates. 
Finally, it should be noted that the results presented here are based 
only on the 2014 elections. Strong as they are, they have a limited power 
of generalization. New investigations should retake these tests with new 
elections and, if possible, also examine municipal legislatures. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. OLS Regression Models for the Chamber of Deputies (Contain-
ing All Candidates) 
Dependent Variable: 
(%) Spend (%) Vote 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
(%) Spend  0.496*** (0.008) 
0.497*** 
(0.006) 
Incumbent 2.479*** (0.081) 
0.742*** 
(0.048) 
0.745*** 
(0.047) 
Ex-mayor 0.949*** (0.145) 
0.610*** 
(0.078) 
0.611*** 
(0.078) 
(%) 2010 Party voting  0.016*** (0.004) 
0.011*** 
(0.002) 
0.012*** 
(0.002) 
Pentecostal 0.074 (0.164) 
0.712*** 
(0.126) 
 
Evangelical  0.029 (0.115) 
 
Religious title  0.026 (0.127) 
0.018 
(0.092) 
(Pentecostal  UCKG)   0.629*** (0.101) 
UCKG   0.987*** (0.184) 
Federal coalition 0.301*** (0.054) 
0.042 
(0.029) 
 
Woman 0.172 (0.048) 
0.107*** 
(0.028) 
0.105*** 
(0.026) 
Black 0.122*** (0.044) 
0.008 
(0.728) 
0.010 
(0.027) 
Age 0.001 (0.002) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
0.004*** 
(0.001) 
PSC 0.097 (0.329) 
0.009 
(0.070) 
0.020 
(0.070) 
PRB 0.327*** (0.118) 
0.426 
(0.063) 
 
Constant 0.296*** (0.096) 
0.290*** 
(0.051) 
0.299*** 
(0.051) 
N 4942 4942 4942 
R2 0.234 0.620 0.619 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. * for p<0.1; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01. 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
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Table A.2. OLS Regression Models for the State Legislative Assemblies 
(Containing All Candidates) 
Dependent Variable: 
(%) Spend (%) Vote 
  Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
(%) Spend  0.523*** (0.005) 
0.525*** 
(0.005) 
Incumbent 0.945*** (0.018) 
0.435*** 
(0.010) 
0.433*** 
(0.010) 
Ex-mayor 0.418*** (0.029) 
0.218*** 
(0.015) 
0.219*** 
(0.015) 
(%) 2010 Party voting  0.011*** (0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
0.002*** 
(0.001) 
Pentecostal 0.075* (0.043) 
0.402*** 
(0.030) 
 
Evangelical  0.042 (0.027) 
 
Religious title  0.048 (0.029) 
0.010 
(0.018) 
(Pentecostal  UCKG)   0.335*** (0.027) 
UCKG   0.580*** (0.051) 
Federal coalition 0.068** (0.009) 
0.020*** 
(0.005) 
 
Woman 0.089*** (0.009) 
0.044*** 
(0.005) 
0.044*** 
(0.004) 
Black 0.035*** (0.008) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.004) 
Age 0.002 (0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
0.001*** 
(0.001) 
PSC 0.018 (0.020) 
0.004 
(0.010) 
0.010 
(0.010) 
PRB 0.047* (0.026) 
0.037*** 
(0.014)* 
 
Constant 0.205*** (0.019) 
0.092*** 
(0.010) 
0.098*** 
(0.010) 
N 12589 12589 12589 
R2 0.256 0.678 0.678 
Note:  Standard errors in parentheses. * for p<0.1; ** for p<0.05; *** for p<0.01. 
Source:  Elaborated by the author from TSE data. 
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Avaliando a Força do Apoio Eleitoral das Igrejas Pentecostais: 
Evidências do Brasil  
Resumo: Desde a década de 1980, o número de candidatos pentecostais 
eleitos para os legislativos brasileiros têm crescido de maneira notável. 
Estudos anteriores argumentaram que o fenômeno está relacionado ao 
apoio das igrejas pentecostais a candidatos específicos. Até hoje, no 
entanto, essa afirmação tem sido baseada apenas em etnografias ou estu-
dos baseados em poucos casos de candidatos eleitos. Com base em um 
novo banco de dados de candidatos evangélicos (protestantes) para a 
Câmara dos Deputados e Assembléias Legislativas, tento responder às 
seguintes perguntas: Candidatos pentecostais arrecadam menos recursos 
de campanha do que outros candidatos? Qual é o efeito de ser um can-
didato pentecostal sobre o voto nas eleições legislativas brasileiras? A 
estrutura da igreja é relevante para esse efeito? Usando modelos de re-
gressão OLS, mostro que ser pentecostal tem um efeito negativo, embo-
ra não significativo, sobre os gastos de campanha. Além disso, há uma 
relação estatística positiva entre ser pentecostal e votos e entre o apoio 
de igrejas mais centralizadas e votos. Evidências qualitativas de seis polí-
ticos pentecostais que perderam o apoio de suas igrejas em algum mo-
mento entre as eleições, tentaram a reeleição e se saíram consideravel-
mente pior do que antes, reforçam a importância de contar com o apoio 
de uma igreja pentecostal. 
Palavras-chave: Brasil, eleições, evangélicos, pentecostais 
 
